Employing the stochastic frontier approach, this paper investigates cost X-efficiency in China's banking sector over the period [1985][1986][1987][1988][1989][1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002]. The objective is to assess whether different ownership types and banking reforms affect X-efficiency. A two-stage regression model is estimated to identify the significant variables influencing X-efficiency. The results show that on average, banks are operating 50-60% below the X-efficiency frontier. The jointstock banks are found to be more X-efficient than the state-owned commercial banks, and it appears that X-efficiency was higher during the first phase of bank reform.
Introduction
For decades, policy makers, regulators, and managers have been concerned with the issue of how efficiently banks transform their various inputs into multiple financial products and services. In the literature, one of the most common measures used is cost X-efficiency. It involves selecting the optimal scale and mix of inputs, given the output bundle and input prices. To date there has been no published work on measures of cost X-efficiency (hereafter X-efficiency) for Chinese banks, which is the principal objective of this paper. Using a standard parametric method/stochastic cost frontier approach, the cost X-efficiency of four state owned and ten joint stock banks is computed for the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . In addition, a two-stage regression model is employed to identify the potential correlates (e.g. bank reform) of X-efficiency. The results, which confirm the relative X-inefficiency of the state owned banks, could help bank regulators formulate policies by shedding light on how banking reform and market structure affect efficiency. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief outline of the current Chinese banking system, followed by a literature review in section 3. Section 4 describes the data and methodology; the empirical results are reported in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
China's Banking System
Until 1978, China operated an economic and financial system based on socialist principles. The People's Bank of China (PBC) not only issued currency, but was the financial hub of each State Economic Plan. In 1978, China embarked on major economic reforms with the objective of increasing economic efficiency and improving resource allocation. In line with most sectors of the economy, the banking system was the focus of significant, albeit gradual, reforms. To date, there have been two stages of reform, from 1979 to 1992, and from 1993 to present 3 . Stage one began with the creation of a "two tier" banking system, consisting of the People's Bank of China (the central bank) and four state owned banks: the Bank of China (BOC) 4 , the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the China Construction Bank (CCB) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). Initially there was a high degree of functional segmentation between them. By 1985, they were allowed to accept deposits and make loans to households and corporates (mainly SOEs), via nation-wide branches 5 . By 1986, most had expanded to universal banks, with trust, securities, and insurance affiliates 6 .
Between 1985 and 1992, to promote more competition, the Chinese government permitted the establishment of new "small and medium sized" commercial banks, which initially offered banking services to households and firms, mainly in the regions and cities 7 . This group included the Shenzhen and Guangdong Development banks, the CITIC Industrial Bank, Bank of Communications, China Merchants Bank, China Everbright Bank and Hua Xia Bank.
Many are joint-stock, i.e. shareholder owned.
In 1993 the State Council announced a second stage of bank reforms in the "Decision on Financial System Reform" 8 . One objective was to create a competitive commercial banking sector where state banks co-existed along side other forms of banking institutions 9 . Numerous reforms have been implemented since 1993 10 , resulting in a banking system which currently consists of:
• The central bank, PBC: responsible for the implementation of monetary policy, though the State Council (China's equivalent of a cabinet) sets interest rates. The
Governor of the PBC is on the committee that advises the State Council.
• The China Banking Regulatory Commission: established in 2003, it is the supervisory authority for banks. The PBC has a financial stability bureau to take decisions about liquidity support in the event of bank runs. 4 The Bank of China began as a private bank in 1912. 5 At the end of 1992, each bank had an average of about 30,000 branches and sub-branches, though there were large variations. The ABC had over 56,000 and at the other extreme the BOC had 1,352. The ICBC had just under 32,000. 6 However, universal banking was short-lived. From 1993 onward, banks had to terminate their securities and insurance operations. 7 Later, two of these banks expanded beyond their regions, with nation-wide branches. 8 Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1994) 9 Wu (1998) 10 Space constraints prevent a review of them here. For more detail, see Fu (2004), and Wu (1998) .
• Three policy banks were established and are funded through issues of state bonds and loans from the PBC.
• Four state-owned commercial banks: provide nationwide wholesale (to large and medium sized enterprises) and retail banking services. Overseas branches have been established to serve Chinese customers abroad.
• Eleven 11 joint stock banks, with shares owned by the state, private sector, and some foreign concerns. The state and/or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) hold 60% to 70%
of non-tradable shares -only four have a small proportion of shares traded on the stock market 12 . These banks offer retail and wholesale banking services in medium sized (and large) cities.
• City Commercial Banks (111) owned by local government, local enterprises, and households. Commercial banking services (intermediary, settlements, money transfers, etc.) are offered to city-based small and medium sized enterprises and residents, though they are also trying to attract larger firms headquartered in their respective cities, which would normally do business with a state bank. There is some customer overlap with the 758 Urban Credit Cooperatives, though the coops offer basic banking services (taking deposits, making small loans) to residents and small local firms in urban areas.
• Rural Commercial Banks (3): like their urban counterparts but have commercial bank operations in rural areas.
• Rural Credit Coops (35,544): each coop supplies basic banking services to residents and local enterprises based in a particular rural area.
• In 2004, there were roughly 204 foreign bank subsidiaries, which are permitted to provide nation-wide foreign exchange facilities to foreigners and Chinese citizens. Fu (2004) , and Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (1993, 2003) Given that the state is a major shareholder of joint stock banks, a legitimate question is whether there is any difference between the two types of bank. The State Council only recently (late 2003) accepted the principle of private ownership, which explains why China's private equity markets are still in an embryonic stage. In the absence of private capital to fund major projects 14 , the state owned banks play a special role in China's economic system.
While these banks continue to assist in fulfilling social welfare objectives, they will be subject to "soft" budget constraints. By contrast the joint-stock banks were established to facilitate the development of an efficient banking system, and it is rare for them to be involved with the implementation of state policy. In view of these differences, one might expect the Xefficiency of the joint-stock banks to be superior to that of the state banks.
There have also been attempts to address the problem of the increasing amount of bad debt held by the "big four" state banks. These banks are, by any measure, effectively insolvent, but continue to function because of the injection of funds by central government. Their bad debt problem is largely due to the banks' support of loss making state owned firms. According to official estimates, non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans is about 25% but
Whalley (2003) puts unofficial estimates as high as 50% to 60%. The World Bank (2002) estimates that to restore the banking system to financial health, the stock of government debt will have to increase from 20% to 75% of GDP, and its servicing is likely to be a serious burden for the government 15 . At the end of 2002, the official estimate of the non-performing loans for the joint stocks was 12.39% of total loans -half of that of the state banks, though again, the private estimates are much higher.
China is in the unique position of having a largely insolvent state banking sector which is highly liquid: liquidity ratios average about 57% for the big four, similar to those of the big four UK banks 16 . Not only is the savings rate high (30% of GDP), but customers are content to keep their deposits at these banks because they are confident the state will always come to their aid. Likewise, state banks remain unconcerned about loans to loss making SOEs, because they are considered "safe" -the state will bail them out. This situation has created serious moral hazard problems. 
Literature Review
Quite exhaustive surveys of the literature already exist 18 . For this reason, the review here is confined to studies of X-efficiency in emerging economies where the banking system has been subject to reform. Chen (2001) , using data from 1988-97, found banks' X-efficiency had substantially increased in Taiwan's deregulated banking market. Likewise, Hassan and Marton (2003) concluded that bank reforms in Hungary improved X-efficiency scores between 1993 and 1998. Hao et al. (2001) , using data from 1985-1995, reported that financial reforms in Korea had little or no significant effect on banks' X-efficiency. Isik and Hassan (2002) found that following liberalization (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , Turkish banks' X-efficiency worsened over time, as did Hardy and Patti (2001) , when they computed the X-efficiency of all Pakistani banks during a period of deregulation, 1993-1998.
Some studies also investigated the relationship between X-efficiency and types of bank ownership, i.e. state versus private. Again, the empirical results are mixed. In their study of Turkey, Isik and Hassan (2002) reported that private banks were more X-efficient than state banks, but in Pakistan and Croatia 19 , state banks were found to be more X-efficient. These mixed results are not surprising, for two reasons. First, the studies are based on data from 17 Until 1998 it was the central bank rate plus a premium added by the bank, up to a limit of 10%, with the exception of rural credit cooperatives, where it was 40%. In 1998, these limits were raised from 10% to 20% for small and medium sized enterprises and from 40 to 50% for the RCCs. 18 For an extensive review, see Berger and Humphrey (1997) , who surveyed 130 X-efficiency studies of various types of financial institutions from 21 countries. 19 For Pakistan: Hardy and Patti (2001) ; For Croatia: Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998). different countries, at different stages of bank reform. Second, agency theory posits that in the presence of asymmetric information, managers act in their own interest rather than that of the principal, in both state owned and listed firms.
Methodology and Data

Methodology
Cost X-efficiency measures the extent to which a bank's costs approximate those of the "best practice" or least cost bank, producing an identical output bundle under the same conditions.
The measure is derived from a cost function where the dependent variable is each bank's total costs, and the independent variables include the prices of inputs, the quantities of variable outputs, and a composite error term. A general version of this cost function for bank i may be written as
where: C = total costs w i = the input prices y i = the output quantities ε i = u i + v i u i = an X-inefficiency factor that may raise costs above the best-practice level v i = the random error incorporating the measurement error or a random shock to bank costs, deemed occasional.
The X-inefficiency factor u i incorporates both technical inefficiencies from using too much of the inputs to produce the same outputs, y i , and allocative inefficiencies from failing to react optimally to relative prices of inputs, w i . The standard assumption is that the X-inefficiency and random error terms can be multiplicatively separated from the remainder of the cost function. After taking logs on both sides of equation (1), the cost function becomes:
X-efficiency is defined as the ratio of the predicted minimum costs that would be used if the bank were as efficient as the best-practice bank in the sample facing the same exogenous variables (w, y) to the predicted actual costs, adjusted for random error. Berger and Mester (1997) used a bank-specific measure of X-efficiency as follows: X-efficiency is the proportion of costs or resources that are used efficiently: an X-EFF ratio of 0.80 would indicate that the bank is 20% less cost efficient relative to the best-practice bank operating under the same conditions. X-efficiency theoretically falls in the interval (0,1], and equals one for a best-practice bank within the observed data. One limitation is that the estimated X-efficiency is a relative measure against the best practice bank within the sample.
The best practice bank itself may not be efficient when compared to banks outside the sample.
To measure the X-efficiency of Chinese banks, this study adopts the widely used parametric technique -the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). Under the SFA, bank-specific estimates of X-inefficiency, i u , are obtained by using the distribution of the X-inefficiency term conditional on the estimate of the entire composite error term, as proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982) . The mean of this conditional distribution for the half-normal model is shown as: The half-normal assumption for the distribution of X-inefficiencies is relatively inflexible and assumes that most banks are clustered near full X-efficiency. Following Greene (1993) , two additional alternatives are used here. One is a model with an exponentially distributed disturbance developed by Aigner et al. (1977) Stevenson (1980) argued that the assumption of zero mean in equation (5) In line with most of the bank X-efficiency literature, this study adopts a translog functional form rather than a more flexible form such as the Fourier-flexible (FF) specification. The FF specification requires more degrees of freedom but with only a few banks and a short history, the Chinese data are limited by comparatively few observations. The translog cost function is specified in equation (7), below. Note that in line common with the published work in this area, the time and bank subscripts are dropped for ease of exposition. (2001), all the cost and output quantities are specified as ratios of the total assets, z, to control for scale biases in the estimation of X-efficiency.
Data
This study employs annual data (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) for each of the four state-owned and ten jointstock commercial banks, listed in Table 2 . There are 187 observations; 54 are from the first reform stage (28.9%), and 133 from the second reform stage (71.1%). Unless otherwise stated, all of the data come from of the Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various editions). Table 3 supplies the summary statistics for all variables used in the cost function in equation (7). In the literature, there are two main approaches to measure the flow of services provided by banks. Like Humphrey (1992) , Berger (1993) , Peristani (1997) and Esho (2001) , the intermediation approach is adopted here. However, following a suggestion made by Berger and Humphrey (1997) , it is modified to capture the dual role played by deposits, i.e. they are treated as both inputs (used to fund loans) and outputs (providing services to depositors such as security, liquidity, and interest on some types of deposits). Finance and Banking (2003) Some authors have augmented outputs by including off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities (e.g., Jagtiani et al. 1995; Stiroh, 2000; Altunbas et al. 2001; Vander Vennet, 2002) . They argue that bank output may be understated if measured solely by the banks' balance-sheets, especially with the growth of derivatives and asset backed securitization. To address this problem, these studies have added non-interest income as a proxy for OBS activity. For completeness, this study includes non-interest income as one of the outputs, even though Chinese banks (and many banks in the West) are far less active in these newer forms of OBS business.
20 .
Another issue is whether the efficiency models should be controlled for differences in output quality. For example, banks with more problem loans are likely to incur higher costs associated with the extra monitoring and negotiating, and they may also have to pay higher rates for deposits and other sources of funds. Such differences will be picked up as variations in bank X-inefficiency. Proxies used to measure these bank-level differences in output quality include some measure of loan losses 21 .
20 For example, Obay (2000) finds 200 US commercial banks accounted for 85% of the securities business, and of these , 5 had a 60% market share. 21 For example, the volume of non-performing loans (NPLs- Clark and Siems, 2002) ; provisions for loan losses (Drake and Hall, 2002) ; the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (Altunbas et al. 2000) ; or risk-weighted assets (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996) . Finance and Banking (1986 -2003 ), China Statistical Yearbook (2003 . Notes: 1. All financial variables measured in million's of constant 1985 RMB. 2. Total costs (C): operating costs plus interest costs, including costs of funds, fixed assets, and labour. 3. Total assets (z): all assets listed on the left-hand side of the balance sheet. 4. Total deposits (y 1 ): short-term deposits, short-term savings deposits, fiscal deposits, long-term deposits, and long-term savings deposits. 5. Total loans (y 2 ); short-term loans, trade bills, bills discounted, medium and long-term loans, and impaired loans; excludes loan loss reserves. 6. Total investments (y 3 ): short-term investment, trading securities, securities held under Repo agreement, and long-term investment, while excluding investment loss reserves. 7. Non-interest income (y 4 ): operating income less interest income. 8. The cost of funds (w 1 ): the ratio of total interest expenses on borrowed funds to total borrowed funds. Total interest expenses on borrowed funds include interest paid on total deposits plus interest paid on interbank borrowing. Total borrowed funds include total deposits, borrowing from central bank, deposits from banks, borrowing from banks, borrowing from non-bank financial institutions, deposits against other credit facilities, bonds issued, and long-term borrowing. 9. The cost of employees (w 3 ): The ratio of total expenses on employees to the number of employees.
Total expenses on employees are unavailable, so two categories of average wage are applied here: the annual average wages paid by state-owned and other types of financial institutions, respectively. Though the number of employees at the four state banks, and some joint stock banks is known, the data are incomplete for 6 of the joint stock banks. Following Altunbas, et al. (2001) , Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002) , and Vander Vennet, R. (2002) , it is assumed that the growth rate of employee numbers is the same as that of the total assets for a given bank. 10. The cost of fixed assets (w 2 ): the ratio of total expenses on the fixed assets to total fixed assets.
Total fixed assets = gross fixed assets less depreciation. Total expenses on the fixed assets = operating expenses minus expenses on employees.
However, the case for including these types of measures depends on the extent to which they are exogenous. If, for example, non-performing loans (NPLs) are largely due to negative macroeconomic shocks (bad luck), then they should be controlled for. However, it is more likely there is a high degree of endogeneity due to poor risk management, cutting back on screening and monitoring, or making loan decisions without anticipating changes in the business cycle. 22 Berger and Mester (1997) found the X-efficiency estimates of (6,000) US banks to be roughly the same using either the average ratio of NPLs to total loans in a given state or a bank's own NPL ratio. Berger and deYoung (1997) and other studies reported mixed evidence on the exogeneity of NPLs and other similar variables. In light of these findings, and the lack of reliable Chinese data on individual banks' non-performing loans, they are excluded from this study.
Empirical Results
X-efficiency Estimates
The parameter estimates of the stochastic frontier regression may be found in Appendix 1.
The inefficiency residual u of the regression is used to derive the X-efficiency estimates 23 .
The mean X-efficiencies for the sample banks from 1985 to 2002 are reported in Table 4 .
Under the half-normal assumption, the grand mean efficiency score for the 187 observations is 0.407 suggesting that, for a given level of output, the banks could use inputs more efficiently and so reduce costs by approximately 60%. Over the entire period, state banks and joint stock banks are, on average, 41% and 49% X-efficient, respectively. This contrasts with average figures of 68% for emerging markets; 85% for the developed economies 24 , though any inferences must be treated with extreme caution in view of differences in data, periods of estimation, banking structure, and the relative nature of this measure. As predicted, the jointstock banks are, on average, about 8.5% more X-efficient than the state banks, and the difference in average X-efficiency between the two groups more than doubles (from 6% to 13%) between the first and second stages of bank reform. Though the X-efficiency scores fell between the first and second stages of reform, most of the decline was due to state banks (11%) rather than the joint stocks (4%).
There is some variation in the scores depending on the model being used. Table 4 shows that for the whole sample, the half-normal model yields an X-efficiency score of 41%, rising to 52% for the exponential model. Although different assumptions produce different sample mean efficiencies, both Pearson's and Spearman's correlation coefficients between pairs of 23 Following conventional practice, the individual parameter estimates are not discussed because the colinearity inherent in the translog specification makes them difficult to interpret (Hardy and Patti, 2001 efficiency estimates for all sample observations are significant with high values (Table 5) .
Thus, the scores obtained from the three models are consistent with each other no one model is superior. correlation between the X-efficiency estimates obtained by stochastic frontier analysis and "simple" measures of efficiency such as the ratios of total cost to total assets (TC/TA), and total cost to total income (TC/TI). Table 6 reports the results. As expected, X-efficiency (using any of the distribution assumptions) is negatively correlated with the cost to asset and cost to income ratios. Using Pearson, the results are significant at the 1% confidence level, but insignificant under the Spearman measure. Thus, in general, the X-efficiency estimates are consistent with the simple indicators of efficiency. Note: TC/TA: total cost/ total assets. TC/TI: total cost/ total income.
Potential Correlates of X-efficiency
Following increasingly common practice 25 , a two-stage regression was performed to explore the relationship between the X-efficiency estimates and a set of economic and financial variables. In particular it is useful to assess whether differences in ownership structure and/or either stage of the reform process significantly influenced X-efficiency. This two-stage procedure has its limitations. Berger and Mester (1997) argue such analyses are suggestive but not necessarily conclusive, because X-efficiency, the dependent variable, is obtained from an estimate and its standard error is not taken into account in the subsequent regression or correlation analysis. Thus, it is only possible to draw inferences about correlation, not causality.
The estimating equation for the two-stage procedure appears below. In common with the published work in this area, the time and bank subscripts are dropped for ease of exposition. ε β β β β β β α
where: OWN = an ownership dummy, 0 for state-owned and 1 for joint-stock; REFORM = a reform dummy, 0 for banks in the first reform stage (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) , and 1 for banks in the second reform stage (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) ; PF/TA = purchased funds (non-deposit funds) over total assets; TL/TA = total loans over total assets; TI/TA = total investment over total assets; NI/PR = non-interest income over pre-tax profits;
The independent variables are selected based on findings from previous studies 26 and on available data. OWN is included to test for possible differences in efficiency between the state-owned commercial banks and the joint-stock commercial banks. The REFORM dummy assesses whether or not there were differences X-efficiency during the two reform periods.
TL/TA, TI/TA, and NI/PR are included to test whether different output mixes affect Xefficiency, while PF/TA measures whether dependence of purchased funds (rather than deposits, which tend to be a cheaper source of funding) affected banks' X-efficiencies. Table 7 provides the summary statistics for each of the variables, and Table 8 Finance and Banking (1986-2003) .
Note: X-efficiency scores are derived from previous regressions.
The positive, significant coefficient on the ownership dummy (under all three distribution assumptions), suggests the joint-stock banks were more X-efficient than the state banks, which is consistent with the individual X-efficiency scores in Table 4 . The coefficient for the reform dummy is significantly negative 27 , meaning stage one contributed more to Xefficiency than stage two reforms. Again, this is in line with the earlier observation that Xefficiency was higher during stage one of the reforms. This finding might be explained by the purchase of expensive fixed assets, such as computers and telecommunications, during the 26 Isik and Hassan (2002) ; Berger and Mester (1997) . The increased expenditure on technology during the second reform stage should translate into greater technical efficiency, though this was likely delayed by problems such as the need to acquire experienced personnel or train existing staff to use the new technology, and to acclimatize customers to new bank services, such as ATMs. Nor would it necessarily improve allocative efficiency, which raises a related point: the price mechanism. In China, the government sets retail and business deposit and loan rates. 32 Hence banks did not have the option of raising revenues (through changes in loan/deposit rates) to offset the substantial rise in fixed assets expenditure (especially by the state banks) during the second period of reform.
28 Automated transfer refers to electronic processing of debits/credits. Network based information processing means that most/all banking offices are operating online, which leads to E-commerce, Internet banking, and etc. 29 This involved network-based information processing with 32 computer centres, 10,016 ATMs, 58,646 POS terminals, 227 self-banks and 13 call centres (Jiang, 2001) . 30 All fixed asset figures are in real terms, that is adjusted for inflation (1985 real value) . 31 All references to $ in this paper are USD. The exchange rate used here is $1=RMB8.2773 (end of 2002). 32 As noted in section 2, bank loan rates to SMEs and loans made by rural credit cooperatives have been flexible (with an upper ceiling) since 1999. However, these loans are a tiny proportion of total loans. Note: 1. OWN = an ownership dummy, 0 for state-owned and 1 for joint-stock; REFORM = reform dummy, 0 for banks in the period 1985-1992; 1 for banks in the period 1993-2002; PF/TA = purchased funds (nondeposit funds)/ total assets; TL/TA = total loans/ total assets; TI/TA = total investment/ total assets; NI/PR = non-interest income/ pre-tax profits. 2. The F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the slope coefficients (excluding the intercept) in the regression jointly equal to zero. 3. Results at 1-5% significant level of confidence are in bold. 4. Standard errors are in brackets, and p values are in parentheses.
The coefficient on PF/TA is significantly negative: an increase in the proportion of purchased funds (non-deposit funds) reduces X-efficiency, probably because this form of funding is likely to be more costly than deposits 33 . During the two stages of reform, the dependence on purchase funds (PF/TA) dropped from 25% to 20% for state banks, and from 21% to 15% for joint-stocks. So in the second stage, X-efficiency should have increased, all else equal. The decline in average X-efficiency means the reduced dependence on purchased funds was more than offset by other factors affecting X-efficiency, such as the increased expenditure on fixed assets combined with extremely limited options for raising revenue.
Another result that warrants some discussion is the lower X-efficiency for state-owned banks compared to the joint stocks, and the finding that most of the rise in X-inefficiency between the two reform stages was due to the state banks. Though partly explained by the state banks'
higher expenditure on fixed assets, there is an additional issue: bank objectives. Recall the earlier argument that state banks are likely to be less cost effective because they are expected to meet social welfare goals and are subject to "soft" budget constraints. By contrast, even though the central and local governments are key shareholders in the joint stock banks, they have been subject to relatively "hard" budget constraints. This argument is supported by the size of loans and capital injections state banks received from the government and central bank. Comparing their respective cost-efficiency scores before and after their shares were listed, a ttest showed that two (China Minsheng Banking Corporation and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank) out of three joint stocks experienced a significant rise in cost Xefficiency. However, X-efficiency fell for the Shenzhen Development Bank, the first bank to be listed in 1991 35 .
Conclusions
Employing the stochastic frontier approach, this paper investigated cost X-efficiency in 33 For the last two decades, the average cost of raising funds has been 87% of total costs. average, the sample banks would have increased their X-efficiency (by reducing costs) by about 50%-60% had they been operating on the X-efficiency frontier. The joint-stock banks were found to be relatively more X-efficient than the state banks, and the gap between them widened during the two reform stages.
A two-stage regression model was estimated to identify the potential correlates of Xefficiency. The results suggest X-efficiency among China's banks sector could be improved if more state banks were converted to joint-stock ownership, the dependence on purchased funds is reduced, greater cost control is encouraged, and hard budget constraints replace soft ones. Overall, bank cost X-inefficiency is an important issue that should receive more attention from researchers, regulators and policy makers in China.
Though the relative nature of X-efficiency and lack of data on foreign banks in China means there is no hard evidence, it is likely that China's commercial banks are less X-efficient than their foreign counterparts. Any comparison of studies across countries must also be treated with extreme caution, but the X-efficiency scores for the US (88% to 94%) and EU (76% to 82%) banks are substantially higher than those for China's banks. 36 The recent decision to transform two state banks into partly listed, albeit state controlled joint stock banks suggests the Chinese government recognises the importance of making banks answerable to shareholders if they are to become more cost X-efficient and meet the challenges of foreign bank entry from 2007 onward.
36 US scores comes from Berger and Mester (1997) and Bauer et al (1998) . The EU score is from Altunbas et al. (2001) . 
Appendix 1. Stochastic Frontier Regression Parameter Estimates
